The concept of Communication-proof equilibrium is extended to infinite games. To that end we make use of abstract stable sets as defined by Greenberg in his Theory of Social Situations.
Introduction
The concept of Communication-proof equilibrium, Com-PE, was proposed in Ferreira (1996) for finit games. Here we present its extension to infinit games using the approach in Greenberg (1989) . To understand this definitio think of a group of people that arrives at an agreement and then must leave the room. The problem is that, when a player leaves, he may rightly suspect that the remaining players will change their actions taking as given his own strategy. A coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, Coalition-PNE, (Bernheim et al., 1987 , from now on B,P&W) is an arrangement that will not be changed regardless of the order of exit. To modify the definitio for extensive form games one needs to take into consideration not only the usual problems of time consistency but the renegotiation issues as well. In particular, if part of the deviation can be observed, the possibility of a reaction by the opponents cannot be ruled out. Unlike the definitio of perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, PCoalition-PNE, provided by B,P&W, the concept of Com-PE reflect these points and can be regarded as an extension of both Coalition-PNE and renegotiation-proof equilibria.
This section follows the approach by Greenberg (1989) where the stable sets are used to extend recursive definition to the infinit case.
A von Neumann and Morgenstern abstract system (AS) is a pair (D, s ) where D is an abstract set and s is a dominance relation ( f s d will be read as 'f dominates d'). Let (D, s ) be an abstract system, and let 
Let G be a multi-stage game. Inspired by Definitio 2 an abstract system (D, s ) is introduced. Let the elements of the abstract set consist of a coalition, a subgame and a strategy profil in this subgame,
where S is the set of strategy profile in the subgame after h; and let the domination relation be
The next proposition (the proof of which is just the proof of the lemmas after it) relates the ASS of (D, s ) with the definitio of Com-PE for finit games and allows for a definitio applicable to infinit games.
Proposition 1. Let K be an ASS of (D, s ); then, for finit games, we have that for all h
) and neither of the following is
Proof. The proof is by induction in the number of stages t. 
Proof. If t 5 1, it comes from Lemma 2 in Greenberg (1989) .
2B 2B (i9) implies (i) by induction hypothesis and (ii9) implies (ii) by setting x 5 (x , s ).

B 2B
Since this characterization of a Com-PE is not based on backward recursion, it can be used to formulate a general definition covering both finit and infinit games (in the number of stages and players). Proof. Let h(C , g , s )j be an infinit sequence with (C , g , s ) s (C , g , s ) for all i. By
finitenes of the sets of coalitions and histories and because the domination relation requires that either
we have that, in the tail of the sequence, C 5 C and h 5 h . This tail is
clearly transitive. According to corollary 4b in Arce and Kahn (1991) , this is a sufficien condition for the uniqueness of the abstract stable set if it exists.
Proposition 2 cannot be generalized to infinit horizon games. Perhaps the simplest example to show this is the following. Consider a game consisting of a set of h1, 2, . . . j lions, in this order. Each lion can eat the lion before it (except lion 1, that can eat an antelope) or not. If he does not, the game ends, but if he ate the lion before him (or the antelope), the next lion plays. Each lion prefers firs to eat the antelope (directly or by eating the lion immediately before him if he ate the lion that ate the lion . . . that ate the antelope) and not to be eaten, second to do nothing and third to be eaten (there is no use in eating a lion that did not eat the antelope directly or indirectly). If there are n lions, there is a SPE that depends on whether n is even or odd. If n is even, odd numbered lions decide not to eat and even numbered ones eat the previous lion only if he ate the lion that ate the lion . . . that ate the antelope. If n is odd, it is the odd numbered who eat and the even numbered do not eat. If the number of lions is infinite the two equilibria just described are two SPE (and Com-PE) The differences between Com-PE and PCoalition-PNE are now clearer. Condition (3) is equivalent to condition (2) when restricted to the stage where the deviation takes place. After the deviation is known (k ± h), 3 is replaced with (1), the condition that allows for reactions against the deviation by any subset of players.
